Lordy, lordy
The crunch time for the future of the House of Lords, and Britain's constitutional destiny, is
getting near. Tony Blair has said, perhaps rightly, that the compromise solutions suggested are unworkable and that the stark choice lies between a wholly elected and a wholly appointed second chamber. He's in favor of a wholly appointed chamber. Robin Cook, the Leader of the House of Commons, and other ministers are behind a wholly elected chamber, and the Tories and Lib Dems tend that way as well. It's a free vote, meaning that party whips will not be applied, so MPs are free for once to vote with their consciences.
I think it's telling that the Lords themselves voted massively for an appointed House. Lord Rees-Mogg converted to that view in the belief that part of the point of the Lords is its wisdom and expertise, which would almost certainly be lost in an elected chamber. He has a point. If the Lords is to be a revising chamber primarily, then it needs those characteristics.
But I don't think that's what is needed. A purely revising chamber is no balance and rarely a check on the power of the Commons as Executive. We need a genuinely independent Legislative body again, and so an Elected Chamber is necessary. Yes, it will become a rival to the power of the Commons, but that House's supremacy was based on the idea that it alone in the British mixed polity had democratic legitimacy. If there is another body with that legitimacy, then the Commons can no longer claim supremacy. It can claim prerogatives -- such as the right to initiate financial legislation and, more importantly, to form the Executive Government -- but its legislative supremacy will have no rational basis any more. I don't think this is a perfect separation of powers; the dual nature of the Commons as Legislature and base of the Executive needs to be thought through again. But overall, I think the British Constitution needs a balancing power to the Executive once again far more than it needs a thought-laden body (although, God knows, it needs that as well).
There is one caveat to this argument: the party system in the UK could result in a party having majorities in both Houses and thereby resulting once more in an elected dictatorship. This is, however, possible in virtually every system. The checks and balances against such an eventuality reside in constitutional documents, especially in Bills of Rights. I've said before how difficult it would be to introduce such over-riding documents into the British system, but a way should be found. It speaks volumes for the level of constitutional discourse in the UK that such considerations are not even mentioned.
UPDATE: Be sure to check out Michael Jennings'
comments on the Australian system.